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The ScarCruft workforce (sometimes called APT37 or Temp.Reaper) is a countryside subsidized APT actor we first reported in 2016. ScarCruft is understood to be aware of North Korean defectors, reporters who cover North Korea-related information and govt organizations associated with the Korean Peninsula, between others. Lately, we have been approached by way of an information team of workers with a request for technical lend a hand everywhere their cybersecurity investigations. Because of this, we had a chance to accomplish a deeper investigation on a number compromised by way of ScarCruft. The sufferer was once as soon as inflamed by way of PowerShell malware and we came upon proof that the actor had already stolen information from the sufferer and feature been surveilling this sufferer for a lot of months. The actor additionally tried to ship spear-phishing emails to the sufferers’ friends operating in companies associated with North Korea by way of the usage of stolen login credentials.

In keeping with the findings from the compromised tool, we came upon further malware. The actor applied 3 forms of malware with an equivalent functionalities: variations applied in PowerShell, Space house home windows executables and Android tactics. Even supposing supposed for various platforms, they percentage a an equivalent command and keep watch over scheme according to HTTP conversation. Due to this fact, the malware operators can keep watch over all the malware circle of relatives by the use of one set of command and keep watch over scripts.

We have been operating intently with an area CERT to research the attacker’s command and keep watch over infrastructure and as a result of this, we have been able higher know the way it in truth works. The APT operator controls the malware the usage of a PHP script at the compromised information superhighway server and controls the implants according to the HTTP parameters. We have been additionally able to obtain a lot of log information from the compromised servers. In keeping with mentioned information, we recognized further sufferers in South Korea and compromised information superhighway servers which have been used by ScarCruft since early 2021. Moreover, we came upon older variants of the malware, delivered by the use of HWP paperwork, courting all over again to mid-2020.

Further details about ScarCruft is to be had to consumers of Kaspersky Intelligence Reporting. Touch: [email protected]

Spear-phishing file

Prior to spear-phishing a imaginable sufferer and sending a malicious file, the actor contacted an acquaintance of the sufferer the usage of the sufferer’s stolen Fb account. The actor already knew that the imaginable serve as ran a business associated with North Korea and requested about its supply standing. After a dialog on social media, the actor despatched a spear-phishing e-mail to the imaginable sufferer the usage of a stolen e-mail account. The actor leveraged their assaults the usage of stolen login credentials, an just like Fb and private e-mail accounts, and thereby confirmed a best stage of class.

After a Fb dialog, the imaginable serve as won a spear-phishing e-mail from the actor. It contains a password-protected RAR archive with the password showed right through the e-mail frame. The RAR dossier contains a malicious Phrase file.

Spear-phishing e-mail and decoy

This file contains a lure associated with North Korea.

MD5Document determineChanged timeCreatorUltimate stored particular person
baa9b34f152076ecc4e01e35ecc2de18북한의 최근 정세와 우리의 안보.dossier

(North Korea’s newest state of affairs and our nationwide coverage)

2021-09-03 09:34:00LeopardCloud

This file contains a malicious macro and a payload for a multi-stage an an an infection procedure. The primary level’s macro contains obfuscated strings after which spawns every other macro as a 2d level.

The primary level macro checks for the presence of a Kaspersky coverage resolution at the sufferer’s tool by way of attempting the next dossier paths:

  • C:Windowsavp.exe # Kaspersky AV
  • C:WindowsKavsvc.exe # Kaspersky AV
  • C:Windowsclisve.exe # Unknown

If a Kaspersky coverage resolution is surely put in at the system, it lets in imagine get admission to for Visible Basic Instrument (VBA) by way of environment the next registry key to ‘1’:

By the use of doing so, Microsoft Administrative center will imagine all macros and run any code with out appearing a safety caution or requiring the person’s permission. Subsequent, the macro creates a mutex named ‘​​sensiblemtv16n’ and opens the malicious dossier everywhere all over again. As a result of the “imagine all macros” environment, the macro will likely be carried out mechanically.

If no Kaspersky coverage device is put in, the macro at once proceeds to decrypt the following level’s payload. With a purpose to do so, it makes use of a variation of a substitution method. The script compares the given encrypted string with a 2d string to get an index of matched characters. Subsequent, it receives a decrypted persona with an index were given from the main string.

  • First string: BU+13r7JX9A)dwxvD5h2WpQOGfbmNKPcLelj(kogHs.#yi*IET6V&tC,uYz=Z0RS8aM4Fqn
  • 2d string: v&tC,uYz=Z0RS8aM4FqnD5h2WpQOGfbmNKPcLelj(kogHs.#yi*IET6V7JX9A)dwxBU+13r

The decrypted 2d level Visible Basic Instrument (VBA) contains shellcode as a hex string. This script is accountable for injecting the shellcode into the method notepad.exe.

Shellcode in the second stage VBA

Shellcode in the second one level VBA

The shellcode contains the URL to fetch the following level payload. After fetching the payload, the shellcode decrypts it with trivial single-byte XOR decryption. Sadly, we weren’t able to collect the whole payload when we investigated this development.

The payload’s obtain trail is:

Host investigation

As a result of our efforts in serving to the sufferer with the research, we had a chance to research the host of the landlord who despatched the spear-phishing e-mail. Once we first checked the method tick list, there was once as soon as a suspicious PowerShell procedure operating with a rather suspicious parameter.

This PowerShell command was once as soon as registered by the use of the Run registry key as a mechanism for endurance:

  • Registry trail: HKCUSOFTWAREMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun – ONEGO

This registry key reasons the HTML Instrument (HTA) dossier to get fetched and carried out by way of the mshta.exe procedure every time the system is booted. The fetched ‘1.html’ is an HTML Instrument (.hta) dossier that contains Visible Basic Script (VBS), which after all executes PowerShell instructions.

The PowerShell script provides easy backdoor functionalities and incessantly queries the C2 server with HTTP POST requests containing a lot of parameters. To begin with, it sends a beacon to the C2 server with the host determine:

Subsequent, it makes an attempt to obtain instructions from the C2 server with the next development:

If the HTTP reaction from the C2 server is 200, it checks the reaction information and executes the delivered instructions.

Delivered informationDescription
ref:Ship a beacon to the C2 server:
HTTP request: ?kind=hi&trail=ship&identification=
cmd:If the command information contains ‘get started’, execute the given command with cmd.exe and ship base64 encoded ‘OK’ with the next POST development. Otherwise, it executes the given command, redirecting the end result to the end result dossier (%APPDATAp.cdesktop.dat), and sends the contents of the dossier after base64 encoding.
HTTP request: ?kind=end result&trail=ship&identification=

We came upon further malware, equipment and stolen information from the sufferer’s host. As a result of restricted get admission to to the compromised host, we have been not able to come to a decision the preliminary an an an infection vector. However, we assess this host was once as soon as compromised on March 22, 2021, according to the timestamp of the suspicious information. One feature of the malware we came upon from the sufferer is the writing of execution effects from instructions to the dossier “%appdatap.cdesktop.dat”. Consistent with the Grab Document Desk (MFT) knowledge, this dossier was once as soon as created the equivalent day, March 22, 2021, and the ultimate amendment time is on September 8, 2021, because of this that that this dossier was once as soon as used till simply earlier than our investigation.

The usage of the extra equipment, the malware operator accrued refined knowledge from this sufferer, even if we will be able to’t assess precisely how such a lot information was once as soon as exfiltrated and what sort of information was once as soon as stolen. In keeping with the timestamp of the folders and information created by way of the malware, the actor accrued and exfiltrated information as early as August 2021. The log information with the .dat extension are encrypted, alternatively can also be decrypted with the one-byte XOR key 0x75. Those log information include the importing historical past. We came upon two log information and every of them contains quite other logs. The ‘B14yNKWdROad6DDeFxkxPZpsUmb.dat’ dossier contains zipping and importing of the folder bearing the equivalent determine. The log dossier items the method as: “Zip Dir Get started > Up Init > Up Get started > Up Document Reach luck > Zip Dir Reach luck”. Consistent with the log dossier, the malware operator accrued one thing from the inflamed system on this folder and uploaded it after archiving.

File archiving and uploading log

Document archiving and importing log

The opposite log dossier, named “s5gRAEs70xTHkAdUjl_DY1fD.dat”, additionally contains a dossier importing historical past, except for for for dossier zipping messages. It processes every dossier with this process: “Up Init > Up Get started > Up Document Reach luck”.

File uploading log

Document importing log

In keeping with what we came upon from this sufferer, we will be able to test that the malware operator accrued screenshots and exfiltrated them between August 6, 2021 and September 8, 2021.  In keeping with what we came upon from the sufferer, we will be able to summarize all the an an an infection timeline. We suspect this host was once as soon as compromised on March 22, 2021. After the preliminary an an an infection, the actor tried to implant further malware, alternatively an error passed off that resulted inside the crash of the malware. The malware operator later delivered the Chinotto malware in August 2021 and nearly for sure began to exfiltrate refined information from the sufferer.

Timeline of the attack on the victim

Timeline of the assault at the sufferer

Space house home windows executable Chinotto

As a result of the host investigation, we came upon a malicious Space house home windows executable and located further malware variants from VirusTotal and our private development assortment. One of the crucial Space house home windows executables contains a compile trail and the malware writer seems to name the malware “Chinotto“.

PDB path

PDB trail

The technical specs on this research are according to the Chinotto malware (MD5 00df5bbac9ad059c441e8fef9fefc3c1) we came upon from the host investigation. One of the crucial traits of this malware is that it contains a lot of rubbish code to impede research. All the way through runtime, the malware copies unused information to the allotted buffer earlier than copying the actual worth; or allocates an unused buffer, filling it with meaningless information, and not makes use of it.

It additionally restores useful strings an just like C2 addresses and debugging messages to the stack at runtime. The malware creates a mutex and fetches the C2 addresses, which will also be other for every development we came upon:

So as to generate the identification worth of the sufferer, the malware acquires every laptop and particular person determine and combines them right through the development ‘%laptop namep.c_p.cuser determine%’. Subsequent, it encrypts the were given string with the XOR key ‘YFXAWSAEAXee12D4’ and encodes it with base64.

The backdoor incessantly queries the C2 server, anticipating instructions from the malware operator. We noticed an early taste of Chinotto malware (MD5 55afe67b0cd4a01f3a9a6621c26b1a49) which, whilst it additionally follows this easy idea, makes use of a hard-coded backdoor command ‘scap’. This implies this particular development is simplest designed for exfiltrating the sufferer’s screenshot.

The Chinotto malware presentations utterly fledged choices to keep watch over and exfiltrate refined knowledge from the sufferers.

ref:Ship beacon to the C2 server:

http://[C2 URL]?ref=identification=%s&kind=hi&trail=ship

cmd:Execute Space house home windows instructions and save the end result to the %APPDATAp.cs5gRAEs70xTHkAdUjl_DY1f.dat dossier after encrypting with a one-byte XOR key
down:Obtain dossier from the a long way flung server
up:Add dossier
state:Add log dossier (s5gRAEs70xTHkAdUjl_DY1fD.dat)
regstart:Copy supply malware to the ​​CSIDL_COMMON_DOCUMENTS folder and execute command to check in dossier to run registry:

“reg upload HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun /v a2McCq /t REG_SZ /d %s /f”

cleartemp:Take away information from folder “%APPDATAp.cs5gRAEs70xTHkAdUjl_DY1fD”
updir:Archive tick list and add it. Archive is XOR encoded the usage of the equivalent key used when emerging the identification worth: ‘YFXAWSAEAXee12D4’
init:Reach information with following extensions from the trails CSIDL_DESKTOP, CSIDL_PERSONAL(CSIDL_MYDOCUMENTS), CSIDL_MYMUSIC, CSIDL_MYVIDEO. Downloads and add them to C2 server:


scap:Take a screenshot, put it aside to the folder “%appdatap.cs5gRAEs70xTHkAdUjl_DY1fD” in an archived development. The dossier to retailer the screenshot has an ‘e_‘ prefix and 10 randomly generated characters as a filename. When importing the screenshot dossier, it makes use of ‘wrpdwRwsFEse’ because the filename
run:Run Space house home windows instructions with ShellExecuteW API
chdec:Obtain an encrypted dossier and decrypt it by the use of CryptUnprotectData API
change:Obtain up to date malware and check out in it:

reg upload HKEY_CURRENT_USERSoftwareMicrosoftWindowsCurrentVersionRun /v m4cVWKDsa9WxAWr41iaNGR /t REG_SZ /d %s /f

wait:Sleep for half-hour
wakeup:Rise up after 2.5 seconds

Every other malware development (MD5 04ddb77e44ac13c78d6cb304d71e2b86) that demonstrated a slight distinction everywhere runtime was once as soon as came upon from the equivalent sufferer. This is similar utterly featured backdoor, on the other hand it reasonably a bit of bit the backdoor command the usage of a unique scheme. The malware checks for the lifestyles of a ‘*.zbpiz’ dossier inside the equivalent folder. If it exists, it reasonably a bit of bit the dossier’s content material subject material topic subject material and makes use of it as a backdoor command after decrypting. The malware authors stay converting the choices of the malware to evade detection and create customized variants relying at the sufferer’s state of affairs.

Along with, there are other Space house home windows executable variants of the Chinotto malware. Except for for the normal Chinotto malware discussed above, a unique variant contains an embedded PowerShell script. The spawned PowerShell command has an equivalent capability to the PowerShell we came upon from the sufferer. However, it contains further backdoor instructions, an just like importing and downloading choices. In keeping with the compile timestamp of the malware, we assess that the malware writer used the PowerShell embedded taste from mid-2019 to mid-2020 and began to make use of the malicious, PowerShell-less Space house home windows executable from the best possible of 2020 onward.

Android Chinotto

In keeping with the C2 conversation building, we came upon an Android tool taste of Chinotto malware (MD5 56f3d2bcf67cf9f7b7d16ce8a5f8140a). This malicious APK requests over the top permissions in line with the AndroidManifest.xml dossier. To reach its function of spying at the particular person, those apps ask customers to permit more than a few varieties of permissions. Granting those permissions shall we inside the apps to collect refined knowledge, along with contacts, messages, name logs, tool knowledge and audio recordings. Every development has a unique package deal deal determine, with the analyzed development bearing “com.protected.give protection to” as a package deal deal determine.

The malware sends its distinctive tool ID inside the equivalent development because the Space house home windows executable taste of Chinotto.

Subsequent, it receives a command after the next HTTP request:

If the delivered information from the C2 server isn’t “ERROR” or “Fail”, the malware begins to hold out backdoor operations.

CommandURI buildingDescription
ref:?kind=hi&trail=ship&identification=Ship the equivalent beacon request to the C2 server
down?kind=dossier&trail=ship&identification=Add the transient dossier (/sdcard/.temp-file.dat) to the C2 server and take away it from native garage.
UriP?kind=dossier&trail=ship&identification=Save transient dossier trail to the end result dossier (/sdcard/result-file.dat) and add the transient dossier.


After sending a beacon, succeed in the next knowledge to the /icloud/tmp-web trail:

  • Wisdom.txt: Telephone quantity, IP take care of, SDK taste (OS taste), Brief dossier trail
  • Sms.txt: Save all textual content messages with JSON development
  • Calllog.txt: Save all name logs with JSON development
  • Touch.txt: Save all touch lists with JSON development
  • Account.txt: Save all account knowledge with JSON development

Add accrued dossier after archiving. The archived dossier is encrypted by way of AES with the necessary element “3399CEFC3326EEFF”.

UploadFile?kind=dossier&trail=ship&identification=Execute command ‘cd /sdcard;ls -alR’, save the end result to the transient dossier (/sdcard/.temp-file.dat) and add it. Add all thumbnails and photographs after encrypting by the use of AES and the necessary element “3399CEFC3326EEFF”.
ETC?kind=dossier&trail=ship&identification=Execute command saving the end result to the end result dossier (/sdcard/result-file.dat)
and add the end result

We came upon that the actor had an hobby in an additional specific dossier tick list in a single variant (MD5 cba17c78b84d1e440722178a97886bb7). The ‘UploadFile’ command of this variant uploads specific information to the C2 server.  The AMR dossier is an audio dossier in most cases used for recording telephone calls. Additionally, Huawei cloud and Tencent services and products and merchandise and products are two of the targets. To surveil the sufferer, the tick list contains serve as folders in conjunction with /Digital camera, /Recordings, /KakaoTalk (a famend Korean messenger), /문건(paperwork), /사진(footage) and /좋은글(excellent articles).

Targeted files and folders

Focused information and folders

To sum up, the actor centered sufferers with a imaginable spear-phishing assault for Space house home windows tactics and smishing for Android tactics. The actor leverages Space house home windows executable variations and PowerShell variations to keep watch over Space house home windows tactics. We would possibly presume that if a sufferer’s host and cellular are inflamed on the equivalent time, the malware operator is in a position to conquer two-factor authentication by way of stealing SMS messages from the cell phone. After a backdoor operation with a completely featured backdoor, the operator is in a position to thieve any knowledge they’re enthusiastic about. The usage of the stolen knowledge, the actor additional leverages their assaults. As an example, the gang makes an attempt to contaminate further precious hosts and contact attainable sufferers the usage of stolen social media accounts or e-mail accounts.

Attack procedure

Assault process

Older malicious HWP paperwork

The danger actor at the back of this promoting and advertising and marketing advertising and marketing marketing campaign delivered the equivalent malware with a malicious HWP dossier. In this day and age, lures associated with COVID-19 and credential get admission to have been used.

HWP hashHWP dossier determineDropped payload hash
f17502d3e12615b0fa8868472a4eabfb코로나19 재감염 사례-백신 무용지물.hwp
(Covid-19 reinfection case-Useless vaccine.hwp)
(Visible Basic Script)
c155f49f0a9042d6df68fb593968e110계정기능 제한 안내.hwp
(Understand of limitation of account.hwp)
(Space house home windows executable)

The Visible Basic Script created by way of the main HWP dossier (MD5 f17502d3e12615b0fa8868472a4eabfb) has an equivalent functionalities to the Chinotto malware. It additionally makes use of the equivalent HTTP conversation building. The second one payload dropped from the malicious HWP is a Space house home windows executable executing an embedded PowerShell script with the equivalent functionalities. Those discoveries divulge connected procedure courting all over again to a minimum of mid-2020.


On this promoting and advertising and marketing advertising and marketing marketing campaign, the actor relied most simple on compromised information superhighway servers, most frequently positioned in South Korea. All the way through this analysis we labored intently with the native CERT to take down the attacker’s infrastructure and had a chance to look into one of the scripts at the C2 servers that keep watch over the Chinotto malware. The C2 script (named “do.php”) makes use of a lot of predefined information to avoid wasting the patron’s standing (shakest) and instructions (comcmd). Additionally, it parses a lot of parameters (identification, kind, trail, information) delivered by way of the HTTP request from the implant:

So as to keep watch over the patron, the C2 script makes use of HTTP parameters. First, it checks the worth of the ‘kind’ parameter. The ‘kind’ parameter carries 4 values: hi, command, end result, and dossier.

Price of ‘kind’ paramDescription
hiRecord and keep watch over the patron standing
commandGrab the command from the operator or retrieve the command from the patron
end resultAdd the command execution end result or retrieve the command
dossierAdd dossier to the C2 server

‘hi’ kind

When the script receives the ‘kind=hi’ parameter, it checks the worth of ‘trail’. On this regimen, the script checks the standing of the patron. The malware operator saves the patron standing to a made up our minds on dossier, the ‘shakest’ dossier on this case. If the ‘ship’ worth is being won, the patron standing is able to ‘ON’. If ‘obtain’ is able as smartly, the patron’s standing log dossier is distributed (nearly for sure so to ship the standing of consumers to the malware operator). The ‘refresh’ worth is for environment all consumers to ‘OFF’ and ‘unencumber’ is used to initialize the command dossier. The consumer simply replies ‘OK’.

'type=hello' commands

‘kind=hi’ instructions

‘command’ kind

So as to prepare the implant’s instructions, the C2 script handles a lot of further parameters. If the ‘kind=command’ along ‘trail=obtain’ is able, it problems a request from the patron to retrieve a command.

There are two forms of command information: not bizarre instructions like an preliminary command or instructions despatched to all consumers, and specific particular person instructions for a made up our minds on consumer. If a person command exists for a consumer, it delivers it. Otherwise, the patron is distributed a not bizarre command. If the ‘trail’ parameter is able to ‘ship’, the request is coming from the malware operator so to save the despatched command right through the C2 server. The usage of this request, the operator can set two instructions information: not bizarre command or specific particular person command. If the ‘botid’ parameter contains ‘cli’, it method this request is for environment a not bizarre command dossier. If the ‘information’ parameter contains ‘refclear:’, the everyday command dossier will get initialized. Otherwise, the ‘information’ worth is stored to the everyday command dossier. If ‘botid’ isn’t ‘cli’, it method this request is directed to a person command dossier. The method of saving the person command dossier is equal to the method used for saving the everyday command.

type=command commands

kind=command instructions

‘end result’ kind

When importing command execution effects coming from the implant, the script units the ‘kind’ parameter to ‘end result’. If the ‘trail’ parameter equals ‘ship’, it saves the worth of the ‘information’ parameter to the person end result dossier: “[botid]-result. The ‘obtain’ worth of the ‘trail’ parameter method retrieving the person end result dossier. The script then sends the end result dossier to the operator after encoding it with base64.

‘dossier’ kind

The ultimate imaginable ‘kind’ command is ‘dossier’. This worth is used for exfiltrating information from the sufferer. If a dossier add succeeds, the script sends the message ‘SEND SUCCESS’. Otherwise, it sends ‘There was once as soon as an error importing the dossier, please take a look at everywhere once more!’.

We came upon that the malware operator used a separate webpage to have a look at and keep watch over the sufferers. From a lot of compromised C2 servers we see a keep watch over web information superhighway web page wearing a ‘keep watch over.php’ dossier determine.

Control page from this case

Regulate web information superhighway web page from this situation

The keep watch over web information superhighway web page presentations a easy building. The operator can see an inventory of inflamed hosts right through the left panel with the corresponding standing “ON” or “OFF”. In keeping with this knowledge, the operator is in a position to side a command the usage of the right kind panel and watch the end result from the patron.


We started this analysis by way of offering give a boost to to human rights activists and defectors from North Korea in opposition to an actor in search of to surveil and observe them.

Moreover, we came upon additional sufferers we couldn’t profile from examining the C2 servers. From examining the attacker’s infrastructure, we came upon 75 consumer connections between January 2021 and February 2021. Maximum IP addresses appear to be Tor or VPN connections, which will also be a lot more prone to be every from researchers or the malware operators.

Examining different C2 servers, we came upon additional details about imaginable further sufferers. Except for for connections coming from Tor, there are simplest connections coming from South Korea. In keeping with the IP addresses, we could distinguish 4 other suspected sufferers positioned in South Korea, and unravel their operating system and browser used according to user-agent knowledge:

Sufferer A hooked up to the C2 server from July 16 to September 5 and has outdated variations of Space house home windows OS and Web Explorer. Sufferer B hooked up to this server on September 4 and operates Space house home windows 8 and Web Explorer 10. Whilst we have been investigating the C2 server, Sufferer D saved connecting to it, the usage of Space house home windows 10 with Chrome taste 78.

Timeline of victims

Timeline of sufferers

To sum up, this promoting and advertising and marketing advertising and marketing marketing campaign is focused on entities in South Korea, which is a most sensible focal point for ScarCruft. In keeping with our findings, we additionally think that the risk actor centered other people rather than specific corporations or organizations.


We came upon a lot of code overlaps with previous ScarCruft malware named POORWEB. To begin with, when Chinotto malware uploads the dossier to the C2 server, it makes use of the HTTP POST request with a boundary generated with a random serve as. When Chinotto malware (MD5 00df5bbac9ad059c441e8fef9fefc3c1) generates a boundary worth, it executes the random() serve as two events and concatenates every worth. The technology procedure isn’t precisely the equivalent, on the other hand it makes use of a an equivalent scheme because the previous POORWEB malware (MD5 97b35c34d600088e2a281c3874035f59).

HTTP boundary generation routine

HTTP boundary technology regimen

Additionally, there could also be further code overlap with Record Stealer malware (MD5 cff9d2f8dae891bd5549bde869fe8b7a) that was once as soon as prior to now applied with POORWEB malware. When the Chinotto malware checks the reaction from the C2 server, it checks whether or not or no longer or not the reaction is ‘HTTP/1.1 200 OK’ and no longer ‘error’. This Record Stealer malware additionally has the equivalent regimen to test responses from the C2 server.

C2 response check routine

C2 reaction take a look at regimen

Except for for code similarity, traditionally, ScarCruft workforce is understood to surveil other people associated with North Korea an just like reporters, defectors, diplomats and govt workers. The objective of this assault is within the equivalent scope as earlier ScarCruft workforce campaigns. In keeping with the victimology and a lot of other code overlaps, we assess with medium self accept as true with that this cyber-espionage operation is said to the ScarCruft workforce.


Many reporters, defectors and human rights activists are targets of refined cyberattacks. In contrast to companies, those targets in most cases don’t have enough equipment to offer protection to in opposition to and reply to extremely professional surveillance assaults. One of the crucial functions of our staff is to lend a hand other people centered by way of APT teams. This analysis stemmed from this kind of undertaking. Our collaboration with the native CERT allowed us to grasp a singular glance into ScarCruft’s infrastructure setup and allowed us to go looking out many technical main points.

The usage of those findings, we came upon further Android variants of the equivalent malware, which has been in point of fact useful in working out and monitoring ScarCruft TTPs. Additionally, whilst attempting to go looking out connected procedure, we exposed an older set of procedure courting all over again to mid-2020, perhaps indicating that ScarCruft operations by contrast set of other people have been operating for an extended time period.

Signs of compromise

Malicious paperwork

HTA dossier

Space house home windows executable Chinotto

PowerShell embedded Chinotto


Android tool Chinotto


Payload information superhighway information superhighway internet hosting URLs

hxxps://api[.]onedrive[.]com/v1.0/stocks/u!aHR0cHM6Ly8xZHJ2Lm1zL3UvcyFBalVyZDlodU1wUWNjTGt4bXhBV0pjQU1ja2M_ZT1mUnc4VHg/root/content material subject material topic subject material

Command and keep watch over server


MITRE ATT&CK mapping

TacticMeansMeans Identify        
Useful helpful useful resource BuildingT1584.006Compromise Infrastructure: Internet Services and products and merchandise
Preliminary Get entry toT1566.001Phishing: Spear-phishing Attachment


Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visible Basic

EnduranceT1547.001Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder
Protection EvasionT1140


Deobfuscate/Decode Wisdom or Wisdom

Masquerading: Are compatible Unswerving Identify or Location



Tool Proprietor/Person Discovery

Tool Wisdom Discovery



Display screen Seize

Archive Accumulated Wisdom: Archive by the use of Library

Command and RegulateT1071.001


Instrument Layer Protocol: Internet Protocols

Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography

ExfiltrationT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

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